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ABSTRACT
The level of entrepreneurship and commercialization of inventions at universities in the
United States varies widely. This study attempts to uncover the factors that may explain
the differences in the attitude toward entrepreneurship and commercialization found at
academic institutions. To this end nineteen interviews with faculty researchers,
inventors, entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, technology transfer officers, and others were
conducted. The different perceptions toward entrepreneurship and commercialization at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University, and Harvard Medical
School and its associated research hospitals were examined with particular care.
Several factors that are significant in promoting entrepreneurship and interest in the
commercialization of ideas were identified. Although these factors may account for the
observed differences, no one factor was singled out as being the most important. These
factors include the presence of mentors and role models, the composition of the
institution's intellectual property, cultural differences, the conflict of interest policy, a
critical mass of people, the technology transfer process, and the availability of university
venture funds. Many of those interviewed believed that the nature of intellectual property
and accessibility to mentors and role models by the researchers and inventors were
probably the most significant of all factors for enhancing entrepreneurship.
Thesis Supervisor: Edward B. Roberts
Title: David Sarnoff Professor of Management
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Technology licensing and the creation of start-up companies are attractive to universities
because these activities not only disseminate beneficial knowledge for public use, but
also can enhance the universities' reputation, increase regional economic development
and. in some cases, can be quite profitable to the school. The passage of the Bayh-Dole
Act of 1980 [Public Law 96-517] was followed by a significant increase in university
licensing and intellectual property programs. However, the level of entrepreneurship and
commercialization of inventions at universities in the United States varies. This study
attempts to understand the factors that may explain the differences in the perceived
attitude toward entrepreneurship and commercialization at academic institutions by
examining two universities that conduct biomedical research in the Metropolitan Boston
Area. One advantage in comparing neighboring institutions is that the influence of
regional differences is minimized.
Throughout the world, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Harvard
University, and the Harvard Medical School and its associated hospitals are regarded as
research leaders. MIT is also looked upon as being entrepreneurial and, indeed, has been
responsible for the creation of a significant number of spin-off companies. In contrast, at
Harvard and, in particular, at the Medical School Campus, the attitude of the faculty and
staff is not generally oriented toward entrepreneurship. This study examines MIT,
Harvard University, and Harvard Medical School and its associated research hospitals
and. to a lesser extent, Boston University by means of a series of interviews.
Furthermore, this study identifies and defines the factors that are most significant in
6
promoting an atmosphere of entrepreneurship and interest in the commercialization of
ideas.
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Chapter 2: Background Information
As a member of the Faculty of Harvard Medical School, in Boston, Massachusetts, I
experienced firsthand the frustration endured by me and my colleagues who are interested
in working with industry to build upon ideas and other inventions originating from our
research. There are few colleagues available whom I can ask about the process of
bringing inventions to the market place, either through licensing or through the process of
forming a start-up company. Publication is considered the preferred route of knowledge
dissemination at Harvard Medical School. In contrast to the situation at the medical
school, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) fosters an environment in which
entrepreneurship is not only accepted, but is encouraged. Like MIT, the amount of
intellectual property at Harvard University and especially at Harvard Medical School and
its affiliated teaching hospitals is substantial. The study described herein examines the
different attitudes at these institutions toward entrepreneurship and the commercialization
of ideas in order to discover the factors that may explain these differences.
To appreciate the culture surrounding entrepreneurship at MIT, the next section of this
chapter briefly describes the history of MIT and its relations with industry.
MIT and Entrepreneurship
William Barton Rogers founded MIT in 1861; his purpose was to create an institution to
"respect the dignity of useful work." MIT developed close ties with industry from its
inception and this relationship is perpetuated today by the MIT Industrial Liaison
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Program. During the Second World War major technological effort at MIT was directed
toward the development of useful instrumentation and other materials to win the war.
Following the end of the war, MIT president Karl Taylor Compton helped create
American Research and Development (ARD), the first institutional venture capital fund.
The eventual head of this fund was the famed General Georges Doriot, Professor of
Industrial Management at Harvard Business School. In addition, Compton and his
successor as president of MIT, James R. Killian. were proponents of faculty maintenance
of close ties Awith industry and they also encouraged entrepreneurial activity. Of note, it
is common for MIT faculty to consult outside of MIT about one day a week and for some
members to form their own company. Although in some instances issues of conflict of
interest may arise. it has been rare for MIT faculty who have founded companies to
resign from their MIT pos.tions.
It is noteworthy that the dominant pattern of the technology companies in the Greater
Boston-Route 128 region is derived from MIT laboratories and departments while the
proliferation of new technology companies in "Silicon Valley" is mostly the result of
multiple spin-offs of existing companies. Furthermore, despite the strong
entrepreneurial culture in the Boston area. it was not until the biotechnological revolution
that Harvard University began to play a role in the entrepreneurial arena.2 In 1989 Louis
published a survey that reported that the Harvard life sciences faculty ranked tenth, with
26% of the members holding "equity in a company whose products or services are based
1 Roberts EB. Entrepreneurship in High Technolog: Lessons from MIT and Bey)ond. New York: Oxford
University Press: 1991:35.
2 Ibid. 36.
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on their own research, " compared to the MIT life sciences faculty which ranked first
with 44% holding equity.3
Technology Transfer
History
In 1980 the Bayh-Dole Act [Public Law 96-517] changed the relationship of industry to
universities, not-for-profit corporations (such as research hospitals), and government
sponsored research laboratories. Passage of the act did two things: first, it allowed these
institutions and other recipients of government sponsored research (such as small
businesses) to commercialize their inventions. Second, the act allowed these institutions
to offer exclusive license of their technology with hope of diffusing discoveries to the
public that indirectly funds the research through tax dollars. Supporters of the Bayh-Dole
Act believed that unless universities were given the power to exclusively license
patentable inventions, many of the findings of federally-funded research would never be
made available to industry or considered for commercialization. This is important
because university research is the primary source of basic research discoveries in the
United States and is a major source of competitive strength in world markets. In this
connection, it should be pointed out that the National Science Foundation reported in
- Louis KS. Blumenthal D, Gluck ME, Stato MA. Entrepreneurship in Academe: An Exploration of
Behaviors Among Life Scientists. Administrative Science Quarterly, March 1989;34:127.
10
March 1997 that three-quarters of all patent applications in the United States were the
result of publicly-funded research.4
The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act was followed by a significant increase in university
licensing and intellectual property programs. For example, a recent survey of 131
universities by the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) found that
the number of inventions disclosed in fiscal year 1996 increased by 9.3% relative to
1995. 5 Licensing income increased over the same period by 22.1% and totaled $365.2
million. According to its 1997 university survey, AUTM found that 87% of all license
revenues were from the area of life science.6
Invention Characteristics
Jensen and Thursby examined the stage of development of licensed inventions in a
survey of 135 university technology managers (see Table 1).7 Only 12% of the licenses
were for discoveries that had immediate practical or commercial use and over 75% were
no more than a proof of concept (i.e., no prototype or lab scale only).
1 Rodin J. Federal Research Facility Needs: Judith Rodin. Congressional Testimony before the Senate
Subcommittee on Science on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science. and Transportation. April 28, 1998
5 Technology Transfer-Administration of the Bayh-Dole Act by Research Universities. United States
General Accounting Office Report B-2 75266, May 7, 1998
6 Massing DE (ed.). Association of Univ ersit' Technology Managers Licensing Survey: Fiscal Year 1997.
Norwalk. CT: Association of University Technology Managers; 1998:2.
Jensen R. Thursby M. Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Tale of University Licensing. NBER fWorking
Paper #6698, 1998:5.
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Table 18
Stage of Development of licensed inventions which were *
Proof of concept but no prototype
Prototype available but only lab scale
Some animal data available
Some clinical data available
Manufacturing feasibility known
Inventor cooperation required
Ready for practical commercial use
48
29
25
5
8
71
12
*Percentages need not sum to 100.
Most licensed technologies are, therefore, at a very early stage and require considerable
development to become a marketable product. Inventor cooperation is generally required
during the development and commercialization process in addition to a significant
investment of money and time by the licensee. There is no guarantee of successor
commercial viability and the risks for the licensee increase with earlier and more basic
technologies.9 In addition, early stage discoveries also require greater intellectual
property protection.
Reagent and biological materials (e.g., monoclonal antibodies and cell lines) as well as
software make up the majority of inventions that have immediate commercial use and
they are generally licensed for a fixed fee.'0
s Table 1 is modified from Table I in Jensen R, Thursby M. Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Tale of
University Licensing. NBER Working Paper #6698, 1998.
9 Nelsen L. Identifying, Evaluating and Reporting Innovative Research Developments at the University.
In Peterson GR (ed.) Understanding Biotechnology Law: Protection, Licensing, and Intellectual
Properr),y Policies. New York: Marcel Dekker; 1993:25.
'o Jensen, op. cit., 5.
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Weighted Mean 
Licensing and Patent Statistics
This section presents some of the statistics concerning technology licensing at MIT,
Harvard University, Harvard Medical School and its affiliated hospitals, and Boston
University. Table 2 shows the level of sponsored research at these institutions for fiscal
year 1997. Although the total amount of support for sponsored research at MIT is close
to that for the Harvard Medical Community, it should be noted that approximately half of
$714 million awarded included support for Lincoln Laboratory ($331 million) and for
Whitehead Institute ($18 million). Of particular interest is the significant absolute dollar
amount of industry research support awarded to the Harvard Medical Community ($104
million) compared to MIT ($67 million) and Boston University ($10 million). However,
it should be emphasized that all of the $67 million awarded to MIT by industry was
exclusively for use by the school and excluded Lincoln Laboratory and Whitehead
Institute. This amount of industrial support represents 18% ($67MM/$365MM) of the
total on-campus research expenditures and is higher than Harvard Medical Community at
14% ($104MM/$745MM) and Boston University at 8% ($10MM/$132MM).
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Table 2: Total Sponsored Research Expenditures FY1997"
(All numbers are in million $) Federal Industrial
TOTAL Government
INSTITUTION Sources
Harvard University $367 $265 $14
Harvard Medical School 2 122 97 4
Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital 89 58 15
Brigham & Women's Hospital 154 109 22
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute 89 76 14
Massachusetts General Hospital 212 129 40
The Children's Hospital 79 56 9
Harvard Medical Community(TOTAL) 745 525 104
MIT 714+ 620 67
Boston University (*FY 1998 Data) 132* 97* 10*
This total is the sum of the support received by Harvard Medical School and its associated
hospitals as shown above.
+ Approximately half of this amount went to support Lincoln Laboratory ($331 million) and
Whitehead Institute ($18 million).
§ MIT on-campus federal government funds is $271 million.
Table 3 shows the number of invention disclosures, patents and licenses issued for fiscal
year 1997. Here again, there is a significant number of disclosures and new patents at
both MIT and the Harvard Medical Community. Although there were more invention
disclosures at the Harvard Medical Community than at MIT, the number of patents filed
and issued to both is approximately equal. The number of licenses and options executed
at the Harvard Medical Community may be greater than MIT because of the significant
number of biological materials, such as cell lines and monoclonal antibodies, that are
non-exclusively licensed.
" Massing, op. cit., 145.
1 Harvard University, Office for Sponsored Research OSR FY 1998 Annual Financial Report. Cambridge
MA: Harvard University; 1997.
'; Ashley Stevens. Boston University Technology Transfer Office. Personal Communication, May 1999.
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Table 3: Disclosures, Patents, and Licensing for FY 1997'4
In n New U.S. License &
Invention Licenses & Options U.S.
INSTITUTION Disclosures ations Options Yielding Patents
Received Appliled Executed License Issued
Income
Harvard University 119 61 67 232 39
Harvard Medical School's 56 22 41 26
Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital 65 36 53 4 10
Brigham & Women's Hospital 86 52 19 50 20
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute 54 34 23 47 20
Massachusetts General Hospital 123 61 34 43 42
The Children's Hospital 68 21 16 26 18
Harvard Medical Community(TOTAL) 452 226 186 136
MIT 360 200 75 255 134
Boston University (*FY1998 Data)' 6 63* 26* 17* 15* 28*
This total is the sum of the values for Harvard Medical School and its associated hospitals as shown above.
Table 4 shows the gross license income received by the various institutions in fiscal year
1997. Although MIT does not have a Medical School it received income amounting to
$14.8 million from technology related to the life sciences as compared to $19.7 million
received by the Harvard Medical Community. Table 5 shows the number of start-up
companies created in fiscal year 1997 and 1998. MIT had almost the same number of
start-up companies in the life sciences as the Harvard Medical Community. Boston
University was responsible for 3 start-up companies in fiscal year 1998, which is
significant, because their research budget is only one-fifth to one-sixth that of the
Harvard Medical Community which was responsible for 7 start-up companies.
'1 Massing, op. cit., 90, 108, 126, 129, 132, 146, 150, 154-156
'5 Harvard Technology Licensing Fiscal Year 1998 Annual Report to the Committee on Patents and
Copyrights. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University; 1998:13.
16 Stevens, op cit.
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Table 4: Gross License Income Received FY1997 7
(All numbers are in million $) Physical
INSTITUTION TOTAL Life Science
Harvard University 16.5 15.6' 0.8
Harvard Medical School 9.3 9.3 0
Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital 0.3 0.3 0
Brigham & Women's Hospital 2.7 2.7 0
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute 3.2 3.2 0
Massachusetts General Hospital 2.6 2.6 0
The Children's Hospital 1.6 1.6 0
Harvard Medical Community(TOTAL) t 19.7 19.7 0
MIT 21.2 14.8 6.3
Boston University (*data not available) N/A* N/A* N/A*
This total is the sum of the gross license income by Harvard Medical School and its
associated hospitals as shown above.
" $5.56 million of income was part of a patent enforcement settlement. The adjusted FY 1997
total license income is $10.85 million.' 8
FY 1997 FY 1998
INSTITUTION Life Life
Total TotalSciences Sciences
Harvard University I 0 0 0
Harvard Medical School 0 0 0 0
Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital 0 0 I 1
Brigham & Women's Hospital 2 2 1 1
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute 0 0 0 0
Massachusetts General Hospital 3 3 3 3
The Children's Hospital 2 2 2 2
Harvard Medical Community(TOTAL) 7 7 7 7
MIT 17 5 16 .7
Boston University (*FY1998 Data) 20 3*
t This total is the sum of the start-up companies at Harvard Medical School and its associated
hospitals as shown above.
+ Start-up companies formed using technology licensed from the institutions shown.
' Massing. op. cit., 113, 151.
'8 Harvard Technology Licensing Fiscal Year 1998 Annual Report to the Committee on Patents and
Copyrights. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University; 1998:3.
"9 Messing, op. cit., 135, 157.
20 Stevens, op cit.
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Table 5: Start-up Companies Formed: FY 1997 and 1998'9
Finally, Table 6 shows the number of licenses executed with equity: 6 at Boston
University, 8 at MIT, and 4 at the Harvard Medical Community.
Table 6: Licenses Executed with Equity FY1997 2'
INSTITUTION Licenses executed with equity
Harvard University 2
Harvard Medical School 0
Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital 0
Brigham & Women's Hospital 1
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute 0
Massachusetts General Hospital 1
The Children's Hospital 2
Harvard Medical Community(TOTAL) t 4
MIT 8
Boston University (*FY1998 Data)2 2 6*
t This total is the sum of the licenses executed with equity at Harvard Medical School and its
associated hospitals as shown above.
17
21 Massing, op. cit., 138, 158.
22 Stevens, op cit.
Chapter 3: Methods
Introduction
In order to understand the difference in the perceived attitude toward entrepreneurship
and commercialization found at MIT and at the Harvard Medical School and its
associated research hospitals, a series of interviews was conducted. Another aim of this
study was to identify factors that may account for these differences which, in turn, might
suggest ways to increase the opportunities for universities to participate in
commercializing ideas and to engage to a larger extent in entrepreneurship.
Interview Methodology
The method used to gather data for this study was to interview university faculty
researchers. inventors, entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, attorneys, university and
research hospital technology transfer officers and research administrators. All 19
interviews were face-to-face with one exception and were done without the use of any
electronic recording device in order to maintain a relaxed atmosphere. Interview sessions
lasted about 60 minutes.
Some candidates for interviews were selected on the basis of recommendations by Dr.
Edward B. Roberts (David Sarnoff Professor of Management and Chairman of the
Entrepreneurship Center, MIT Sloan School of Management) and the early interviewees
themselves. The final selection of those interviewed was based on this author's
18
estimation of individuals he felt to be especially familiar with entrepreneurship and
commercialization of university inventions.
A short summary of each interview presented in Chapter 4 is based on this author's hand-
written notes taken during the meeting; hence, these synopses can be considered as
reflecting my perception of the opinions expressed by the interviewees.
Occupation of Interviewees
In order to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees their names and affiliations are not
stated in the interview. A ollective list of names and titles of those interviewed is found
in the Appendix.
Nineteen interviews were conducted. The interviewees included six university
researchers, who are also inventors or entrepreneurs, five of whom have been or are
associated with both MIT and Harvard University. A total of six technology transfer
officers from MIT, Harvard University, Harvard Medical School and its associated
research hospitals, and Boston University were interviewed. Three senior-level managers
of industrially sponsored research at Harvard research hospitals, who are also involved in
the management of intellectual property, were interviewed. Three venture capitalists
from the Boston area specializing in medicine and healthcare were included. Also, an
attorney, who was an expert in patent law and invention licensing, was interviewed.
19
Interview Questions
Each interview began with a description of the study's goal. All the interviewees were of
the opinion that there was a difference in the amount of interest shown for
commercialization of ideas and entrepreneurship at the Harvard Medical Community as
compared to MIT. I then put forward an open-ended question such as: "What in your
view are the reasons for the differences between MIT and the Harvard Medical
Community in the areas of entrepreneurship, commercialization of ideas, and the creation
of start-up companies." The interviewees then gave their opinions freely without my
guidance. When they completed their comments, I would bring up the general topics
listed below if they were not already included in their initial discussion; not all the
interviewees were asked to elaborate about every topic. In addition to these topics if
other pertinent and interesting subjects were brought up by the interviewee, such as
"differences in culture" or the role of the technology transfer offices at the institutions, at
my discretion, I would ask them to elaborate on them.
Interview Topics:
1. The influence of the university conflict of interest policy.
2. The effect of the nature of the intellectual property, i.e., the type and stage of
development.
3. Importance of having role models and mentors at academic institutions.
4. The choice of licensing versus creation of a start-up company.
20
5. Issues surrounding inventors having company equity.
6. The value of internal venture funding: the efficacy of the Boston University
Community Technology Fund and Medical Science Partners.
7. Methods to increase awareness of commercialization of ideas and
entrepreneurship.
21
Chapter 4: Interviews
Introduction
This section is a short summary of interviews with inventors, entrepreneurs, venture
capitalists, and university and research hospital technology transfer officers and research
administrators. All the interviews were face-to-face with one noted exception and done
without the use of any electronic recording device. Each interview synopsis is based on
this author's handwritten notes taken during the meeting and, therefore, reflects his
perception of the opinions expressed by the individuals interviewed. Although great care
was taken to ensure accuracy, the possibility of misinterpretation cannot be precluded.
Furthermore, those interviewed did not review these synopses for accuracy or omission.
In order to maintain the anonymity of these people their names and affiliations are not
stated in the actual interviews. The names and titles of those interviewed is given in the
Appendix.
The Harvard Medical Community discussed in this section refers to Harvard Medical
School. Harvard Dental School, and the affiliated Harvard teaching and research
hospitals.
In each case the interviewee was asked to express an opinion about his/her perception of
the differences between MIT and the Harvard Medical Community in regard to
entrepreneurship, commercialization of ideas, and the creation of start-up companies.
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The generous assistance, cooperation, and insights of those interviewed in this study is
sincerely appreciated by the author.
Interview Summaries:
University Researchers and Entrepreneurs
Interviewee A
This individual is an inventor and entrepreneur who has been on the faculty of both
Harvard and MIT. He took great pains to describe in detail his perceived differences in
attitude toward entrepreneurship and commercialization at MIT and at Harvard.
At MIT people start a company for the "joy" of starting a company. It is a team
enterprise of cooperation and the money is a secondary motivation ("no one is greedy").
He generalized that at Harvard Medical School there appears to be "greed" and greater
interest in the money. MIT is very transparent. At MIT one takes an idea, licenses it or
builds a company and the inventor may take equity. He then refrains from further
research in the area of the commercialized idea to avoid the possibility of conflict of
interest. In contrast, at Harvard the inventor usually wants to continue to explore the
same science in his laboratory that he has offered for commercialization and thus there is
no clear separation of the business from the academic research.
There is no such thing as an idea that is too simple on which to base a business. Ideas are
cheap, but trying to make a company out of an idea is always difficult. University
Technology Transfer Offices dramatically overvalue ideas. This condition may arise
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from the publicity surrounding the big licensing hits and the impression that it happens
often, although in general this is not the case. "Bad ideas can be expensive to recover
from," thus it is important for the technology transfer office to hire people who can spot
the most promising ideas. MIT has the highest level of sophistication in this regard.
MIT likes useful things, so when someone has a new idea they ask, "What is it good
for?" At Harvard they ask, "Why is the idea interesting?" Although this is "profound"
and reasonable, interesting ideas generally do not serve as a basis for a business. In
addition, at Harvard more often the "science is chasing a problem."
When the social structure of the institutions are considered, MIT has a flat structure and
hierarchy is not important. Although all of Harvard University has a hierarchical system,
the most dramatic example of class distinction is at Harvard Medical School where even
physicians are categorized by their medical specialty. The hierarchical structure may
hinder some forms of cooperation and collaboration at Harvard.
Some of the intellectual property in the Harvard Medical Community is process related
and similar to what is created at the engineering schools at MIT. In addition,
composition of matter inventions, which make the best patents, are found at both
institutions. Intellectual property usually has the greatest value when it is somewhere
between science and engineering. Patents for innovative processes are more complicated
since many of the end results of the processes can be duplicated by procedures which
circumvent the patented technology. Thus, the "paranoia" displayed by some members
of the Harvard Medical Community causing them to conceal their work may be justified.
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When a good invention or innovation is difficult to license, the creation of a start-up
company may be necessary. In general, small companies are more receptive to new ideas
than are larger organizations that prefer a developed product.
Individuals are recognized favorably at MIT for their entrepreneurial activities and
industrial ties. Working with industry is respectable and a source of pride for the faculty.
Clearly, there is a substantial group of faculty and others at MIT that can act as mentors
for those interested in learning about commercialization and how to participate in the
entrepreneurial process. At Harvard commercial activities are not usually talked about,
instead discussion tends to focus on items associated with the traditional academic
recognition system. Commercial activities and entrepreneurship are not openly discussed
with graduate students at Harvard. One key question is, "Is activity in commercialization
really a part of the academic function?" At MIT it is, while at Harvard it seldom appears
to be.
The fragmentation at Harvard is very notable between the different Harvard Schools. At
MIT. even though Sloan is at the other end of the campus, there are nevertheless people
from the engineering, science and other departments present at the School of
Management and vice-versa.
In summary, in the MIT culture the activity of forming companies is considered part of
the creative enterprise. At the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences, for instance,
creating enterprises is not "bad, but it is outside" of the usual academic mission where
ideas reign supreme. In contrast, at the Harvard Medical Community the culture should
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be similar to that at MIT, but it may not necessarily be so because more cooperation is
needed in the Medical School Community. MIT has a culture that leads to cooperation.
The value system at Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences is based on the creation of
ideas and teaching. The idea itself is sufficient even if it has no application. By
comparison, at MIT ideas are commonly used to solve societal problems. In the Harvard
Medical Community the thrust is more restricted in that the cure of the patient is the
primary goal. These are the key differences between these institutions.
Problem solving has little "charm" at Harvard while at MIT a simpler and better way is
the goal. For example, when asked to make a better watch, at MIT they would use fewer
parts, make it smaller or lighter, etc. In contrast, at Harvard their solution to making a
better watch would be to find a new way to tell time. There are no metrics for measuring
learning. Good scholarship is good scholarship and commercialization has a negative
connotation at Harvard.
Interviewee B
This university inventor believes the difference between the level of innovation,
entrepreneurship, and commercialization of ideas at MIT and at the Harvard Medical
Community may be explained at least in part by the following reasons. First, in contrast
to MIT. there is an inherent "mistrust" at Harvard associated with the conflict of interest
policy. Furthermore, there is more mistrust at Harvard associated with doing things
jointly with industry whereas at MIT there is great interest in such an association. The
mistrust may not be unjustified given that the intellectual property at Harvard is more
basic and at an earlier stage of development. Second, another difference between the two
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institutions is that the technology licensing office at MIT is good at deal making. The
second reason may follow directly from the first in that the issue of mistrust demands
excellent technology transfer, which is readily available at MIT.
At MIT faculty are not discouraged from working with industry, but there is a definite
line between academic pursuits (that must take first priority) and working with industry.
In addition, at MIT investigators are given credit if their technology has an impact in the
,;real world."
The investigators at the two institutions do not appear to be at all different. Thus, in the
Harvard Medical Community there are scientists and clinicians while at MIT there are
scientists and engineers.
Biological innovations have a long development time compared to other types of
inventions though this does not explain the differences between Harvard and MIT. From
an investment perspective, the biotechnology companies have done well if company
valuations are used as a marker. It also takes more time to create value in a
biotechnology company.
The nature of the intellectual property does not appear to be significantly different
between the institutions. Moreover, a patent should describe a new principle rather than
just a new device. Thus the invention of devices or drugs is not an important distinction
when trying to characterize the differences between institutions. Creating value demands
that "smaller ideas" need to be further along in development than "larger ideas."
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Unlike MIT the Harvard Medical Community is fragmented, but this is not a significant
reason for the differences between them. However, the multiplicity of technology
transfer offices in the Harvard Medical Community may render each individual office
less effective than the one centralized technology transfer office at MIT.
The role of venture capital is important and fundamental to the process of forming start-
up companies. Medical Science Partners probably has not had a significant influence
because of the large number of venture capital firms in the Boston area.
A long-range solution for the Harvard Medical Community requires exposure to
entrepreneur role models and a reduction in anxiety about the conflict of interest policy.
In addition, inventions and start-up companies spun out of the Harvard Medical
Community should be internally publicized more widely with emphasis on how they are
being used to help patients and save lives. For instance, at MIT there are several ways
that entrepreneurship, commercialization of ideas, and industrial collaboration are
featured and these include, amongst others, the MIT $50K business plan competition, the
MIT Enterprise Forum, the Lemelson Award, and the Industrial Liaison Program.
Finally, another solution for the Harvard Medical Community may be found in a
collaborative effort between the Harvard Business School and the Medical School which
should increase exposure to entrepreneurship and yield more role models.
Interviewee C
The interviewee is both an inventor and scientific advisor to several companies. He
noted the following differences between MIT and the Harvard Medical Community:
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· MIT is a "monolithic" and "federalist" institution compared to Harvard which is
"fragmented" and "medieval" with separate regimes.
· MIT is designed to be pragmatic and strives to solve society's problems.
* People are aware at MIT of the importance of protecting ideas and are focussed on
finding the "short path" to commercialization.
· MIT is not a healthcare institution and the development time for many inventions is
only about 18 months versus nine years at Harvard Medical School.
Another difference is that at MIT industrial connections can be important in advancing a
faculty member's academic position.
At the Harvard Medical Community the faculty is not as sophisticated in the commercial
sense and it's not part of the culture to think of one's work in terms of translation into a
saleable therapy. In addition, clinical Phase I, II, and III studies (required in medicine for
commercial approval of new drugs or medical devices) carry a large price tag and have a
long time frame. In the biological world the culture is "not about implementation"
whereas in the clinical realm, although there may be lower barriers to innovation, the
patient care gets in the way and issues of conflict of interest may also arise. The concept
of conflict of interest has as its purpose protection of both patients and the institution.
Although, in the final analysis, it does not stifle productivity it does "create an ambiance
not to be entrepreneurial unless you have a fire in your belly." Thus the message is do
not explore entrepreneurship.
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At Harvard Medical Community there is no formal mechanism for people to gain
experience with companies. Furthermore, very few people know that they may consider
commercialization. "Who can one go to and not worry about being criticized" if one is
interested in learning about the commercialization process. One potential solution is to
establish a joint office of entrepreneurship combining Harvard Business School and
Harvard Medical School. Another is to establish a joint Harvard Business School,
Medical School, and also School of Public Health Program which would offer a 6- to 12-
month postgraduate curriculum on entrepreneurship.
Medical Science Partners has not caught hold because the need to produce a returnon
investment got in the way of its original mission to stimulate commercialization. In its
early years it did form some companies, but currently it has "no impact on my life."
Working with industry and with venture capitalists is worthwhile. The networking is
beneficial as is the participation on the boards of several companies. Involvement with
industry has helped focus academic research on the most interesting problems. Overall,
working with industry is helpful and probably one in two or one in three assistant
professors will find that it is a new and valuable knowledge base for them.
The nature of intellectual property is not a major factor in commercialization. Although
in the areas of biology and medicine the stage of development of the idea or invention
and the time when a profit will be made are important factors. With the long time frame
for the development of most biological inventions, it is more difficult to raise money to
support commercial efforts, since many venture capitalists and investors would like to
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invest over a shorter time horizon. Accordingly, it is more difficult to raise money for
funding these ventures.
Interviewee D
The interviewee is a university inventor and entrepreneur. MIT provides better support
for entrepreneurs than the Harvard Medical Community and the former has a very
efficient technology transfer office. MIT is also "monolithic." A "critical mass"
composed of people and resources is found at MIT whereas at Harvard and the research
hospitals this feature is absent owing to competition and fragmentation.
Interviewee E
This is an entrepreneur/inventor at a research hospital who feels that most investigators
consider publishing as the main avenue for establishing priority and disseminating their
findings. However, commercializing is another means of knowledge dissemination and
along with publication is actively pursued by his department. Commercialization is
accomplished through licensing technology to another company or through the formation
of a start-up company. The advantages of licensing are that it allows the transfer process
to proceed quickly and it has less risk. Partnering with an established company improves
the ability to prototype, engineer, have access to equipment, and co-invest rapidly. In
addition. the licensing process transfers the commercial responsibilities to the licensee
and allows the inventor quickly to get back to his lab, something he generally wants to
do.
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Many investigators would like to have one of their ideas serve as the basis for founding a
company. For those inventors who have the desire to build a company, success is best
assured when they are personally involved on a day-to-day basis. Substantial amounts of
money can be made by this route but, of course, it requires a large expenditure of time.
Those who are able to accomplish this attain significant recognition among their peers,
much like "movie stars."
Members of the department have many opportunities to learn the process of
commercialization and the technology transfer office is there regularly to discuss
commercialization issues. For instance, the protection of intellectual property is
important if you are seeking an industrial partner. Faculty are, therefore, well versed in
the kind of information that can be disclosed at scientific meetings and through
publication prior to obtaining a patent for an invention. As a result it is not difficult to
protect the intellectual property through a future patent. Also, now that members of the
department are familiar with the procedure, disclosures of new technology are made
sooner in order not to delay publication. Finally, after an idea is patented the
investigators are typically the ones to go out and market the invention to industry.
Some industry-sponsored research allow the sponsor to review a manuscript prior to
publication to determine whether there are any inventions that may need patent protection
by the research institution prior to publication. This offers only a minimal delay to
publication; abstracts are reviewed within 10 days and final manuscript papers within 30
days.
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The idea of a collaboration between the Harvard Medical Community and the Harvard
Business School to sponsor joint activities to foster entrepreneurship is promising,
although it will take time to develop into something more than a superficial association
between the schools.
The potential for conflict of interest is a frequent topic of discussion at meetings, but
disclosure and surveillance can assuage this anxiety. People tend to assume one of two
extremes when it comes to their career, either they want to protect the institution at all
cost or to make things happen at all cost.
This investigator says he prefers to be in the lab and does not have the time to participate
on company boards. This preference is based solely on practical considerations and not
on "moral grounds." Some people fear that working with industry will tempt the best and
the brightest to leave academia, but there is no evidence that this is a common
occurrence. Several faculty in his department do participate on the scientific advisory
boards of start-up companies. Most investigators enjoy their partnership with industry
and look for more areas in which to continue this kind of association.
Interviewee F
The interviewee is an inventor whose "radical" new idea is the basis of a start-up
company. After his idea was patented it was determined that a licensing agreement with
a pharmaceutical company would not allow the inventor, the institution, and the
pharmaceutical industry to realize the full potential of the invention. Accordingly, the
technology licensing office recommended creating a start-up company and approached a
venture capitalist who committed $7 million to the company. The institution received a
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royalty payment and equity for the use of the patent. The vice president of science at
another firm and friend of the inventor was instrumental in "keeping the ball rolling" to
get the company formed and was the spin-off company's first employee. Since the
laboratory was well funded, equity for the inventor and colleagues was taken in lieu of
company sponsorship of the ongoing laboratory research. The company was able to
reserve a significant position of equity for the future CEO and company employees.
The conflict of interest policy generated no difficulties when the new company was
formed. The inventor became a non-voting member of the board of directors and this
arrangement proved satisfactory to his institution's academic department.
We discussed the differences concerning commercialization at universities such as MIT
and Harvard and he noted that NMIT has the advantage of a history of solving problems in
physics and chemistry. MIT has a history of over 50 years of collaboration with industry,
directed toward making better products and as a result has many industrial contacts. At
Harvard Medical School and the Harvard hospitals there is a significant amount of
support from the National Institutes of Health arnd industrial interactions are not
considered necessary, especially since basic research is emphasized and product
development plays a minor role. He feels that, "basic science rarely has any use
industrially."
Venture capitalists have varying relationships with academic institutions. At MIT the
relationship is good and smooth in contrast to the situation at the Harvard Medical
Community. At the Harvard institutions the tendency is to obtain patents, but the
inventions may not be the types that companies will choose to bring to market. In
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addition, the licensing offices do not concentrate on marketing the inventions after the
patents are obtained. This situation does not hold at MIT.
He does not believe in seed funding, especially at levels of less than $100,000, and he
does not favor technology incubators. Internal institutional seed funds are vulnerable to
internal "politics." Alternatively, it is better to use investment firms to provide
appropriate capital initially and then plan on a second round of financing in the future.
Attorneys
Intenriewee G
The interviewee is both an entrepreneur and an attorney, who has worked with several
technology transfer and licensing offices in the Harvard Medical Community and at MIT.
In comparison to the Harvard Medical Community, MIT is more open, less rigid, and less
bureaucratic. MIT is a "cauldron of ideas' and technology licensing is both centralized
and the focal point for ideas, in contrast to the fragmented technology transfer at Harvard
University and the Harvard Medical Community. The surfacing of ideas is the same at
both institutions. but coordination is better at MIT. The dispersion of the buildings at
Harvard may also play a small negative role by reducing interaction and the potential for
collaboration.
Licensing at MIT is a straightforward process compared to the drawn-out procedure
typically found in the Harvard Medical Community. At MIT emphasis is on business
issues while at Harvard it tends to be the legal aspects surrounding the licensing deal. It
is noteworthy that at some of the Harvard Medical Community institutions sorting out the
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rights to licenses involving industry-sponsored research is very difficult. Lastly, the
technology transfer office at MIT strongly encourages inventors to work with them to
'"push ideas out the door."
The composition of the intellectual property is important to the dynamics of how a
company is formed. For instance, inventions in the area of information technology have
fewer barriers to entry, cost less, and are further advanced than biotechnology when it
comes to creating a product. Biotechnology, however, is more fundamental, has a more
sustainable position, and has the advantage of a longer time frame of eight to ten years
from concept to market, which gives the company management time to weave together
the story and to work with investors. On the other hand, in the case of information
technology there is no incubation period and a relatively short time frame; this situation
does not allow recovery from mistakes. It is interesting to note that inventors in the field
of information technology generally approach the venture capitalists whereas the venture
capitalists go to the universities to seek out inventors working in the field of
biotechnology.
Venture Capitalists
Interviewee H
This venture capitalist feels that leadership factors are most important for successful
entrepreneurship and start-up ventures. First, he feels that it is essential to have role
models and they are typically found at MIT, Stanford, and Berkeley. These mentors are
part of an ongoing system that creates more mentors who will guide future generations.
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Second, the most important role of the technology transfer office is to facilitate the
connection between the inventor and the entrepreneur. It is noteworthy that at MIT and
Boston University the technology transfer people are exceptionally adept at doing this.
For instance, at MIT besides the technology licensing office additional methods to bring
inventors and entrepreneurs together include the $50K business plan competition and the
MIT Enterprise Forum. The licensing function of the technology transfer offices is seen
as a less critical factor. Of note, he suggests that the Harvard Medical Community
needed to create a similar network.
An entrepreneur should be a problem solver who can create value in a company by
combining technology, business, and finance.
Conflict of interest is not an issue, but the "psychology" surrounding conflict of interest
at Harvard needs to change. He suggests inviting venture capitalists, inventors,
entrepreneurs. and others to "put on a fair" to establish contacts. Companies that have
spun out of technology from the Harvard Medical Community should be invited to give
seminars so faculty appreciate the concept of entrepreneurship. Furthermore, role models
are very effective in demonstrating to faculty that it is "cool to invent things" with
commercial potential. On the other hand, not everyone will be interested in starting a
company even though commercializing inventions is good for the inventor, the patient,
and the institution.
He does not believe that patient care prevents physicians from becoming entrepreneurs;
he feels that busy people are good at getting things done.
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Intellectual property procedures at MIT and Harvard are not significantly different and
are not a major reason for the differences in entrepreneurial interest. Nevertheless,
innovative procedures and treatment protocols are generally not a foundation that
supports a start-up company.
He does not believe that an internal fund to develop inventions by supplying seed money
in the $25,000-$50,000 range is needed. He suggests that better use of the existing
resources be made and there should be more collaboration with the business school,
business plan competitions like the MIT $50K contest, arranging for an entrepreneurship
seminar series, and networking. He suggests that leasing office or laboratory space be
considered by early stage companies so that they can develop their inventions. This
procedure is followed at Boston University and it can help remind others on the campus
about potential commercialization.
He regards as positive a model like the Community Technology Fund at Boston
University which he believes has done well in creating university spin-off companies.
In the majority of cases, his venture capital firm learns about university inventions
directly from the professors themselves.
Interviewee I
This venture capitalist noted that MIT is unusual. MIT started as a trade school teaching
practical things. It has a history of spinning off start-up companies going back a "long
way." Entrepreneurship has been at MIT for the past 50 years, since the end of World
War II, beginning with the work of General Georges Doriot. In addition to publishing
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and other related academic pursuits, creating inventions is an important dimension of a
professor's career. At MIT entrepreneurship is promoted because it brings respect,
authority, and recognition.
Harvard research scientists learn, observe, and do. At Harvard Medical School there are
groups translating research into new companies. This is less common at the Harvard
research hospitals.
The infrastructure built around medical innovation is more complicated than that around
other areas. It involves government regulatory bodies and, therefore, it is not as easy for
a medical researcher to be an innovator. The training for a researcher is different from
that of the innovator. For example, in Germany universities and industry only recently
have joined forces.
The innovations need to be sufficiently radical to open a new field. Large companies
tend to stifle innovation. In general, "smart people see it and say I can get a product out
of it." The product must have an impact, or it will not sell. Timing is also important for
innovations as seen in the history of the facsimile machine.
Internal venture capital, like that available at Boston University, is useful for ideas that
are not ripe enough to attract external venture capitalists. In addition, it teaches people to
see how to build companies.
Intenriewee J
This interview was with a venture capitalist who felt "cultural differences" are a major
reason for the difference in the levels of entrepreneurship at MIT and the Harvard
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Medical Community. Entrepreneurship is highly encouraged in MIT's doctoral
programs. Research done in the Harvard Medical Community is very early stage and is
less likely to become the foundation on which to build a company.
The technology transfer offices are under-funded at most of the Harvard Research
Hospitals especially in comparison to MIT, which serves as the "premier model of
technology transfer." Since it is not possible to determine in advance which inventions
are going to be the most valuable, an important mission of the MIT Technology Transfer
Office has been to get the technology into the world beyond MIT.
In order to increase technology transfer and entrepreneurship in the Harvard Medical
Community the interviewee proposed increasing the budget and staff of the Technology
Transfer Offices which should also form a more solid network of relationships with
department chairmen and entrepreneurs. It is his impression that there is an
overabundance of attorneys in many of their transfer offices. A supra-organization to
enable the technology transfer offices in the Harvard Medical Community to work more
closely with each other is not a viable solution because of the long-standing distrust
between the Medical School and the Hospitals.
The conflict of interest policy at Harvard, essentially identical to MIT's, has not caused
significant difficulties in his opinion. An example of the "disincentives" to
entrepreneurship at one Harvard research hospital is the requirement that prevents
inventors from holding equity stock in their name as payment for inventions they created
at and licensed from that hospital. The hospital holds the stock for the inventor until it is
liquidated.
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Internal venturing at universities can be worthwhile, but the venture group must be
independent of the university and its personnel should be compensated similarly to those
in the venture capital community at large. The internal venture group should not have the
right of first refusal to fund technology arising from the university.
Managers of Industry-Sponsored Research
Interviewee K
This interview was with a research manager who feels the major reason for the different
degree of entrepreneurship at MIT and the Harvard Medical Community is that Harvard
is not a nurturing environment for this activity and that there are few mentors available to
offer guidance. Some hospital departments do have industry associations and provide a
nurturing environment complete with mentors, but this is the exception. Furthermore, at
Harvard there are "cultural issues" stemming from the question of the appropriateness to
one's academic career of working with industry in strong contrast to the situation at MIT.
Harvard enforces an "elitism" value system that makes it less attractive to work with
industry and some characterize it as "dirty" to do so. However, at the Harvard research
hospitals industry-sponsored research in the biomedical area is more readily accepted
than at the Medical School. In fact, researchers from the hospitals have been known to
move to industry and from industry back to the hospital on occasion. Clearly, this
collaboration improves the transfer of ideas and knowledge.
Standards at Harvard are different from those at MIT. At Harvard the standard is
publication. while at MIT building things is an accepted practice. He feels MIT is an
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engineering school and its people think pragmatically. What makes Harvard what it is
are the high standards and the significant prestige and pride of being from Harvard. This
value system should not be changed.
The only difference between the Harvard and the MIT conflict of interest rules is the
clinical trials section found in the Harvard rules. The other sections are more
conservative at MIT and aim to protect students from being diverted into research work
that may be of benefit to the industry sponsor. Of note, at MIT there is a "decoupling of
culture with rules." At Harvard there is a high degree of misunderstanding about the
conflict of interest rules. Consulting work is, however, relatively well accepted at
Harvard.
In addition to having marketing know-how and experience working with inventors to
form start-up companies, the Technology Transfer Office at MIT has superb skills that
have endured for decades. Boston University also has competency working with start-up
companies. Entrepreneurs and individuals directing companies are respected at MIT. In
general, the majority of scientists involved in basic research, including non-clinician
physicians. are more interested in remaining in the laboratory than in working to start a
company. On occasion in the Harvard Medical Cru....ity, a deprtment chairperson or
a peer can get in the way of building a company around an appropriate idea.
Most technology transfer offices do not have the resources to do active marketing of
licenses. One of the Harvard hospitals recently hired a marketing manager to help get
inventions licensed. Venture capitalists and entrepreneurs rarely examine unlicensed
patents to find technology to license and market because if a technology transfer officer
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determines that an invention is potentially valuable he would actively seek a licensee and
not depend on having a venture capitalist or entrepreneur in search of inventions
approach him.
One route to licenses for our ideas and inventions is through direct scientist to scientist
communication. Many new products do not arise from industrial research and
development but rather originate from the outside. Scientists from the large
pharmaceutical companies and university researchers attend scientific meetings and at
these events the direct one-to-one communication may eventually lead to licensing
agreements.
Medical Science Partners is looked upon as any other venture capital fund. They do not
fund high-risk ventures such as "proof of concept." The deals they are attracted to are the
same ones that will also attract other venture capital firms. Venture capital firms, in the
opinion of the interviewee, do not respond as well when approached by the Harvard
Medical Community as they do by MIT. MIT knows when and which venture capital
firm to contact.
Medical device innovations are generally improvements of existing devices rather than
examples of a radical new technology. It is, therefore, not uncommon for surgeons and
other clinicians who are pragmatic to work directly with manufacturing companies. It is
unlikely that the idea will have as profound an effect as the creation of a new molecule,
which can often be revolutionary. Many of the technologies that can be licensed, like
laser treatments, have a relatively quick cycle time. The nature of the intellectual
property in the Harvard Medical Community is typically biological and healthcare related
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with a relatively long development time of up to 10 years. However, the Biology
Department at MIT has similar types of intellectual property that are by definition early
stage. Moreover, at MIT there are multiple fields of investigation, some with
significantly shorter development cycles.
Undisclosed intellectual property generally results from the inventor's lack of awareness
of the value of the idea rather than to his lack of knowledge of where to go to disclose the
invention. There probably is a significant amount of undisclosed intellectual property.
The technology transfer office cannot inspect each lab for potential commercial
inventions. However, the climate of awareness at MIT is greater than that in the Harvard
Medical Community. For instance, at MIT if someone licenses a revolutionary invention
or is part of a start-up company, others in the MIT community are very likely to hear
about it. In addition, grants from industry such as those from a pharmaceutical company
are beneficial because they often provide unrestricted funds to the university. Thus, the
attention generated by working with companies signals to others the potential benefits of
collaborating with industry.
Lastly, it is rare to lose patent rights by publicly speaking or publishing data before a
patent is actually obtained, provided disclosure has been made to the technology transfer
office.
Interviewee L
A medical research and licensing manager who was interviewed by telephone made the
following observations:
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· The primary difference between MIT and the Harvard Medical Community is that
money that comes from industry is treated as "suspect" by the latter. At the Medical
School there is disapproval of anything that may contaminate the "purity of the
research."
· The conflict of interest rules in the Harvard Medical Community have a "dampening
effect" and a negative aura associated with them that tend to discourage collaborating
with industry.
* Relationships with venture capitalists are excellent and are therefore not a limiting
factor in creating start-up companies in the Harvard Medical Community and at MIT.
* Medical Science Partners has not had a significant effect.
Interviewee M
This interview was with a medical research manager who feels the main reason for the
differences between MIT and the Harvard Medical Community and Harvard University
itself is the fragmentation existing in these latter two places. Furthermore, at MIT the
strong tradition in the areas of electronics and engineering has generated a history of
industrial collaboration. At MIT there are no patient-care issues and the "mind-set" at
MIT is different.
His organization is considering establishing an internal venture fund to provide seed
capital to fund the development of ideas that are not typically funded by the National
Institutes of Heath because they are too premature to be supported by the venture capital
community.
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Furthermore, the interviewee notes that the technology transfer office has to educate the
faculty that they "do not own the technology" and, therefore, that they should not pursue
the technology transfer on their own.
Conflict of interest was not a major issue in the case of a recent start-up at his institution.
If the hospital has a stake in the company and a clinical study is required, the rules
prohibit the study at the medical center. In this instance, the inventor's laboratory was
well funded and he did not need additional funds to support his laboratory. The inventor
and other laboratory colleagues received an equity stake in the new company. The
institution received some royalty compensation and an equity share. There was concern
initially by the hospital board of trustees about favoring equity rather than royalties alone.
The interviewee noted that it is fine "for a not-for-profit to have equity in a profit-making
entity." The equity in the new company is used to incentivize the inventor to buy into the
new venture and ensures that the investigator's "brainpower" will be there. The hospital
requested that the inventor/founder be a non-voting member on the board of directors of
the new company and a member of the scientific advisory board. Technology transfer
officers are not allowed on the company board of directors.
Officers of Technology Transfer
Interviewee N
This interview was with a technology transfer professional who feels that the Harvard
Medical Community is "fragmented," with its pieces somewhat "divorced" from one
another. The conflict of interest policy at Harvard is almost the same as that at MIT and
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is not the reason for the differences in the level of start-up companies and
commercialization seen at the two institutions. The conflict of interest regulations at
Harvard are somewhat of an impediment to innovation and entrepreneurship. However,
as far as start-up companies are concerned one rarely runs into problems of conflict of
interest arising from stock ownership since such companies when first established do not
issue stock that is publicly traded.
The "culture" of the two institutions is different. MIT is primarily in the education
business while the medical center is in the patient-care business. When dealing with
patients there is a limited market for the technology that can be used to form start-up
companies. MIT is also "entrepreneurial" and people are educated to become successful
business people who can, in turn, become mentors for future entrepreneurs.
The individuals at both institutions teach, carry out research, write grant proposals, and
perform administrative activities. However, at the medical centers there is the additional
activity of patient care. Therefore, less time remains to pursue a start-up company and
other entrepreneurial interests. As a result, some inventors involved in patient care may
opt to be a scientific advisor on a company board.
The quantity of intellectual property in the Harvard Medical Community is actually quite
significant in light of the approximately $1 billion in grant awards received from National
Institutes of Health and the 100-200 new inventions that the Community patents each
year. The recent publicity surrounding the formation of a start-up company at one
institution prompted eight to ten other investigators to declare that they too wanted to
start a company based on their inventions. A start-up company may be the preferred way
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to get the invention out as compared to licensing. However, where possible a licensing
scheme is usually best and can increase the chance of bringing the invention to market.
A technology development fund is being considered which would award support in the
$50,000 to $75,000 range for inventions that are too premature for venture capital
funding and which are not typically funded by the National Institutes of Health.
Unfortunately, internal venture funds are often subject to institutional politics.
The majority of disclosures at this particular interviewee's institution are for molecular
biology-related intellectual property and only 12 or so are by clinicians such as surgeons,
urologists. radiologists, obstetricians and gynecologists, etc. for medical devices. The
latter are straight licensing opportunities.
Interviewee O
This interview was with a technology transfer officer. The Harvard Medical Community
and MIT were compared.
The conflict of interest policy is almost the same at Harvard and MIT, although the
common perception is that they are different. Harvard utilizes a conflict of interest
committee to clarify certain issues involving conflict of interest, such a committee is
rarely used at MIT.
The number of ideas that can support a new company is small. At MIT there is a
"predisposition" to start a new company, while at Harvard the majority of inventors have
no desire to start a company. Furthermore, the faculty at Harvard generally does not
want to spend years immersed in building a start-up company that will take them away
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for their academic research. The preferred route in most cases is to license the
technology thereby enabling the faculty member to return to academic research.
Although there are differences in the type of intellectual property at MIT and Harvard
University there are also similarities. The nature of the intellectual property is only part
of the explanation for the differences in commercialization and entrepreneurship found at
these institutions. Interestingly, the end result of what comes out of the Harvard Medical
School is closer to that at MIT than to that from the Harvard Faculty of Arts and
Sciences.
Intellectual property may not be disclosed by an inventor because he may not appreciate
the commercial value of his invention. Sometimes a more entrepreneurial associate of
the inventor may recognize the value and recommend that a disclosure be made.
There are, to be sure, "pockets" of entrepreneurs in several departments at Harvard
University and the Harvard Medical Community. These people now serve as role models
and in time they may effect a change at Harvard as others begin to appreciate that it is
possible to balance traditional academic pursuits with entrepreneurship. More people are
interested in entrepreneurship now than was the case 10 or 15 years ago. There are more
opportunities and more faculty members continue to realize they can pursue both
academic research and entrepreneurial goals.
Medical Science Partners was conceived at Harvard Medical School about 1985. Its
purpose was to bring together a group of limited partners who would create a fund to
support development research which would fill the gap between an idea and its prototype.
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The ultimate aim was to increase the level of commercialization in the Harvard Medical
Community and to return a profit to Harvard University.
The enormous research budgets of the Medical School and the various Harvard research
and teaching hospitals preclude the possibility of creating one supra-organization to
handle all the technology transfer for the entire Harvard Medical Community. Each
member believes that its own large research budget bestows upon it the right to control
technology transfer.
Interviewee P
This interview was with a technology transfer officer who noted the following:
· The conflict of interest policy at Harvard is a very sensitive detector of potential
conflicts.
* Entrepreneur role models are not found easily in the Harvard Medical Community in
contrast to the situation at MIT.
· There probably is a significant amount of intellectual property that has not been
disclosed to the technology transfer office.
· A program has been established to demonstrate to faculty members the process of
new venture creation.
Technology transfer should be designed as a "short-lived process" i.e., the transfer office
does its job quickly and the entrepreneur then steps in. However at Harvard it is a 'long-
termn' commitment. Few licenses are like Stanford University's "big hit" (Cohen-Boyer
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DNA cloning invention). All universities underfund technology transfer offices. One
useful benchmark measure is the number of full time technology transfer employees per
million dollars of sponsored research.
Finally, cultural issues are significant in that institutions "need to do it their way."
Harvard is careful to guard its good name, especially when working with industry.
Interviewee Q
This person is a technology licensing official who noted that the nature of the intellectual
property affects the likelihood that it can be used as the basis to create a start-up
company. Early stage research is less likely to be used as a foundation for a start-up
company. In addition, in order to consider a start-up company as an alternative to
licensing the technology transfer official must be truly adept at creating start-up
companies and actively seek out technologies that are able to stand on their own.
Interviewee R
This technology transfer official feels that some of the frustration associated with
entrepreneurship at the Harvard Medical Community is the result of the "fragmented
culture." There are competing forces between the hospitals and the medical school but,
in the final analysis, the policies of the hospital will be followed. Each technology
transfer office evolved differently in the Harvard Medical Community resulting in the
creation of different cultures ranging from entrepreneurial to legal in character.
Furthermore, some of the technology offices are strongly oriented toward administering
industrial support for research with the licensing function being of secondary importance.
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Both Harvard and MIT supply technology to the world. Some notable differences
between the institutions are: At Harvard the importance of school structure is strong
while at MIT it is weak. MIT has a more top down organizational structure than Harvard
and there is more networking and less competition between people at the former.
Entrepreneurship at MIT is done on the inventors' own time and is not the primary
product of their work, but rather is a by-product of it. Moreover, licensing and creation
of start-up companies are not part of the academic reward system at MIT.
The interviewee suggested that the Harvard Medical Community set up an supra-
organization to help grow a more entrepreneurial culture and that activities include events
like the MIT Enterprise Forum, a business plan competition, and professors teaching each
other about entrepreneurship. It was further suggested that an academic track be set up at
Harvard Medical School for physicians interested in entrepreneurship which allows for
reduced patient care and fewer academic responsibilities. These individuals could
participate in seminars and other events which would, in turn, teach the process of
commercialization and entrepreneurship to other members of the Harvard Medical
Community.
Medical Science Partners' original mission was to fund the development of technology
arising within the Harvard Medical School complex that was insufficiently developed to
win other support. Harvard University participated as a limited partner and the fund
raised significant capital, but several issues arose including problems with conflict of
interest. Subsequently, the fund's mission changed and it is now required that at least
one person at the company be affiliated with Harvard Medical School in order for the
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company to be eligible for funding from Medical Science Partners. The fund has had
almost no significant impact in the Harvard Medical Community.
In order for internal venturing to have an impact, significantly large awards well above
the $25,000 to $50,000 range must be made. Internal venture funds are vulnerable to
institutional politics when a choice has to be made about which projects should receive
support. Furthermore, students are at some risk of exploitation and may be transferred
from their academic research to commercial development. Finally, the presence of an
internal venture fund may hurt relationships with the venture capitalists if it is believed
that the venture capitalists have "second pick" of inventions.
Interviewee S
This technology transfer officer feels that the MIT conflict of interest policy is very
clearly stated and uniformly applied. There are very few situations requiring clarification
or need for interpretation.
There is fragmentation within the Harvard Medical Community since the Harvard
Hospitals and the Medical School are each independent corporations with their own staff
and income stream. In addition, the Harvard Medical School Technology Licensing
Office is separated from the main Harvard University Technology Licensing Office and
yet the latter has final signing authority for all University deals, even when a deal is
negotiated by the Medical School Office. A meeting to organize all the Harvard Medical
Community affiliates is being considered to discuss marketing and other common issues.
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A technology transfer office deals with two worlds, the faculty and the corporate. On the
faculty dimension it may be beneficial to do short presentations about the technology
transfer process on a recurring basis. For example, a two-day seminar for investigators
similar to Stanford's "licensing 101" should be considered. Frequently, the technology
transfer office makes relatively small amounts of money (but its existence is justified on
the basis of the good it does for the university and the public).
If the technology of an invention is able to stand on its own there is a preference to create
a start-up company rather than license the technology. However, for a start-up to be
considered the inventor must be willing, at a minimum, to be scientific advisor.
Although the inventor does not need to be a line officer in the new company or take a
leave of absence, starting a new company will nevertheless require a great deal of the
inventor's time. One caution is not to tie up technology by forming a start-up company if
a straight licensing arrangement will work.
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Chapter 5: Results and Analysis
Introduction
There is no single reason one institution is more entrepreneurial and more involved with
commercializing ideas than another. I found this to be true in the course of investigating
the differences between MIT and the Harvard Medical Community. This chapter is a
compilation and analysis of the discussions with interviewees and is organized according
to the topics shown in Chapter 3. Interviewees were not asked to rank the order of
importance of the reasons that may explain the differences between the Harvard Medical
Community and MIT although some did so as a matter of course during the interview.
An alternative approach to this study would have been to propose one or more possible
hypotheses to explain the differences between the institutions and use the interviews to
test each hypothesis. However, given the limited resources and small sample size
available, this investigative method was not chosen and instead the method described in
Chapter 3 was followed.
For each topic there is an introduction with background information followed by an
account of the more pertinent comments and opinions expressed by the interviewees. A
discussion of the findings follows. No attempt was made to organize the topics in any
particular order for this report. In Chapter 6, Summary and Recommendations, this
author's opinion about the relative importance of each topic is given.
55
As noted previously, the Harvard Medical Community mentioned in this report embraces
Harvard Medical School, Harvard Dental School, and the affiliated Harvard teaching and
research hospitals.
Conflict of Interest
Conflict of interest is an important and serious issue in academe, medicine, government
agencies, and other organizations. Harvard Medical School has a broad definition of
conflict of interest as shown below:
"A faculty member (full- or part-time) is considered to have a conflict of interest when
he, any of his family, or any associated entity possesses a financial interest in an activity
which involves his responsibilities as a member of the Faculty of Medicine. Included in
these responsibilities are all activities in which the faculty member is engaged in the areas
of teaching, research, patient care and administration."23
Faculty members of Harvard Medical School and Harvard School of Dental Medicine are
required to follow the Faculty Policies on Integrity in Science.24 The policies include
sections concerning conflicts of interest and commitment. Scientists and physicians at
the teaching and research hospitals associated with Harvard Medical School most often
have faculty appointments at this institution. In order to uncover situations that may give
23 Faculty Policies on Integrity in Science. Faculty of Medicine, Harvard University. Boston, MA:
Harvard University; November 1997:13.
24 Ibid., 1-19.
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rise to a conflict of interest, once a year Harvard Medical School requires faculty to
disclose financial interests that they or their families have. Except for the section that
covers clinical trials involving patients, the conflict of interest policy at Harvard is not
significantly different from that at MIT.
A faculty member with a financial interest in a company that manufactures products or
renders services that are derived from his own research through a licensing agreement
must adhere to the following:
* the faculty member cannot receive direct or indirect research support from the
company to support activities at the university
· students cannot be used to carry out research and development projects for the
company
The Policy also covers industry-sponsored research and states that faculty must be
allowed to publish or communicate their research findings freely. The policy at Harvard
suggests guidelines about advance manuscript review by sponsors before submission for
publication so that optimal protection of intellectual property can be achieved. The delay
for this process is typically 30 days, but not more than 60 days. As implied above, a
faculty member receiving industrial sponsorship for laboratory research cannot have a
financial interest in the sponsoring company. The Harvard Medical School Policy also
has guidelines concerning conflicts of commitment, according to which no more than
20% of full-time professional effort may be directed to outside work. MIT has a similar
policy on conflict of commitment.
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Findings
Fourteen of the nineteen people interviewed commented on the conflict of interest policy
at Harvard Medical School and most agreed it was similar to MIT's policy. Nine of the
fourteen pointed out that in the Harvard Medical Community there was an "aura,"
"psychology," "dampening effect," or "inherent mistrust" associated with the Harvard
University policy. Interestingly, of the five entrepreneurs who discussed conflict of
interest four agreed that an aura of mistrust existed. Interviewee C stated the conflict of
interest policy does not stifle productivity, but it does "create an ambiance not to be
entrepreneurial unless you have a fire in your belly." Several felt that at Harvard there
was misunderstanding about the conflict of interest rules and one interviewee said it was
a very sensitive detector of potential conflicts.
At Harvard the inventor often wants to continue to explore the same science in his
laboratory that he has offered for commercialization. In these situations clarification by
Harvard University may be required to avoid a potential conflict of interest. Interviewee
S declared the conflict of interest policy at MIT was clearly stated and uniformly applied,
with few situations requiring clarification.
In summary, all the interviewees who had first-hand experience with technology transfer
and/or the commercialization process believed that the MIT and Harvard University rules
on conflict of interest are similar. It is this author's opinion that the faculty as a whole
may actually not be aware of this. Furthermore, half of all those interviewed stated there
was a feeling of misunderstanding and mistrust associated with the conflict of interest
policy at Harvard which sent a message to faculty that working with industry was itself a
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conflict of interest. In spite of this, one interviewee felt that consulting was relatively
well accepted at Harvard University.
Discussion
Disclosure is an important tool in helping to discover potential conflicts of interest. The
conflict of interest policy at Harvard, although not in itself the major cause for the
differences in the levels of entrepreneurship and commercialization found at MIT and
Harvard Medical School, does appear to play some role. The Harvard conflict of interest
rules, as previously noted, are similar to those in effect at MIT, yet the impression at
Harvard was that industrial collaboration involving money is "bad" and gives rise to a
conflict of interest. Interviewee C, an inventor and entrepreneur, noted that this policy
suggests that one should not explore entrepreneurship at Harvard. This perception
surrounding the conflict of interest policy may, in practice, be secondary in importance to
historical or cultural influences at Harvard. Interviewee K pointed out that at MIT there
is a "decoupling of culture from the rules" while at Harvard the culture and the rules may
be more tightly bound together.
The process of disclosure at Harvard of one's involvement with outside interests may in
itself also reinforce the general sense of mistrust. The conflict of interest rules at Harvard
are part of a pamphlet entitled Faculty Policies on Integrity in Science. According to this
pamphlet, each year the faculty must disclose their personal financial situation and other
potential conflicts of interest. The very title on the pamphlet may causes a feeling of
anxiety on the part of the faculty member. Hence, it is perhaps not surprising in light of
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the foregoing that recently a committee has been formed at Harvard Medical School to
reevaluate its conflict of interest policy.
In summary, the issue of conflict of interest is one of several factors involved in the
differences seen in entrepreneurship and commercialization at MIT and the Harvard
Medical Community. The conflict of interest issue, which appears to be so significant at
Harvard University and the Harvard Medical Community, is apparently less of an
impediment to entrepreneurship and commercialization at other institutions.
Composition of the Intellectual Property
Commercializing technology is the process of bringing to market the results of
experimental studies and research. A research institution is a source of technology or
intellectual property. The intellectual property typically licensed from universities
includes copyrights, patents, cell lines and other biological property, software code
(copyrighted or patented), semiconductor chip maskworks, drawings, trademarks, and
know-how. However, it is the nature of the intellectual property which actually
determines whether the institution can engage successfully in entrepreneurship and the
commercialization of ideas. This is because some types of technology are more desirable
to a licensee, or are more easily protected by patents and copyrights preventing
challenges by competitors, or are more amenable for use as a basis for a start-up
company.
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Levin reported the effectiveness of patents in protecting a discovery is very nonuniform
across the 130 industries he examined.2 Patents were regarded as most effective in
industries with chemical-based technologies such as found in the pharmaceutical
industry, moderately effective for industries dealing with relatively simple mechanical
devices, and least effective for most of the other industries he studied. In addition,
process patents, according to Levin, were less effective than new product patents in most
industries. Thus, a patent better protects a molecule, compound, pharmaceutical agent, or
biological material than a medical device, which itself is frequently better protected than
other types of inventions. Process oriented inventions, like some intended for use in
clinical medicine and in engineering, are not well protected by patents and copyrights.
The type of intellectual property and its stage of development must be considered when
assessing its commercial potential. In a recent study of university technology transfer,
Jensen and Thursby found that only 12% of licenses were for discoveries that were ready
for practical or commercial use, implying that most licensees would usually have to
invest significant development time and money before bringing the product to market. 26
Intellectual properties derived from life sciences tend to be very early stage and far
removed from the final product used by the consumer. Thus, it can be seen for early
stage inventions with a long development time, such as those found in biotechnology, the
financial aspect is rather perilous since it is very difficult to predict whether the
technology will actually work and have worthwhile commercial potential.
25 Levin RC. A New Look at the Patent System. American Economic Review, May 1986;76(2): 199-202.
26 Jensen R, Thursby M. Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Tale of University Licensing. NBER
Working Paper #6698, 1998.
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The role of industrial sponsorship of research also needs to be considered when
examining the commercialization of an institution's intellectual property. Industrial
sponsorship may affect the theme of the laboratory research and thus the type of
intellectual property to be made available for licensing or for use as a basis for a start-up
company.
Findings
The characteristics of intellectual property were discussed with 12 of the interviewees
with ten of them specifically commenting on the differences between MIT and Harvard.
All agreed that the research institution can be a source of intellectual property and that
the nature of the intellectual property is what determines whether the institution can
engage successfully in entrepreneurship and commercialization of ideas. However, six of
ten specifically said they believed that the nature of the intellectual property was not the
reason for the differences in commercialization seen at the Harvard Medical Community
and MIT because it was essentially similar in nature at both places. Interviewee A was of
the opinion that some of the intellectual property in the Hairvard Medical Community is
process related and, therefore, in that respect "not unlike what is created at the
engineering schools at MIT." Two of the three interviewees felt that intellectual property
does play a role in enhancing entrepreneurship at MIT as compared to the Harvard
Medical Community. They further noted that the majority of the research at their
institutions was early stage and less likely to be used as the foundation for a start-up
company. It is noteworthy that the occupation of the interviewees had very little effect, if
any, on their feeling about the role of intellectual property.
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Seven subjects said the biological sciences are typically at an early stage when
commercialization is considered and, therefore, require a relatively long time frame for
development as compared to other types of intellectual property. On the other hand, four
interviewees reported that an advantage of the biological sciences was that inventions
originating from this field are usually more patentable and, therefore, have a more
sustainable position in the marketplace compared to other types of intellectual property.
Moreover, in spite of the longer development time needed for biological innovations, the
protection afforded by patents offers the potential for significant value creation compared
to other types of inventions. Interviewee C pointed out that some biological and life
science inventions require clinical trials in order to obtain government approval to bring
them to market. Clearly, these inventions may not only have an especially long time
frame, but also the additional disadvantage of a large price tag.
Discussion
Jensen and Thursby report that a significant portion of invention disclosures are based on
research carried out in schools of science, engineering, medicine, and nursing.27
Although MIT does not have a medical school, 45% of the total of its active licenses and
options are in the life sciences.28 This finding is consistent with the opinion of the
majority of interviewees who discussed the subject of intellectual property. It was their
27 Ibid.. 5.
28 Massing DE (ed.). Association of University Technology Managers Licensing Survey: Fiscal Year 1997.
Norwalk, CT: Association of University Technology Managers; 1998:100.
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view that the nature of intellectual property at the Harvard Medical Community and at
MIT is quite similar. Therefore, while the nature of intellectual property may be an
important factor in determining whether an institution can engage successfully in
entrepreneurship and commercialization of ideas, in the case of these two institutions it
was not believed to be a major factor responsible for the observed differences. On the
other hand, the nature of the intellectual property may play a major role at other research
universities in determining their involvement with entrepreneurship and
commercialization of ideas. This finding is important relative to the other topics
discussed in this chapter because the kind of intellectual property originating from an
institution is a reflection of the university's mission and cannot be easily changed. In
contrast, most of the other topics dealt with in this report such as, conflict of interest and
mentoring, are part of the supporting infrastructure and are more easily modified.
Inventions derived from research in the life sciences and related areas are often at an
early stage and require long development times compared to many other types of
intellectual property such as software, information technology, or mechanical devices.
For instance, innovations involving medical devices are generally improvements of
existing instrumentation and usually can be brought to market in a relatively short time;
they are seldom examples of radical new technology. It is therefore, not uncommon for
surgeons and other clinicians, who are of a practical bent, to work directly with
manufacturing companies. In general, it is unlikely that inventions such as mechanical
devices will have as profound an effect on society as the creation of a new molecule,
which can often not only be revolutionary, and of broad benefit, but can be also more
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easily protected by a patent. Interestingly, out of a total of 33 start-up companies
originating from MIT technology in the years 1997 and in 1998, 12 were in the area of
life sciences. In the same two-year period a total of 14 start-up companies, based on
technology from the Harvard Medical Community, were founded.
In summary, the nature of the intellectual property at a university is a key factor in
determining whether the institution can engage successfully in entrepreneurship and
commercialization of ideas. Institutions that engage in research in the fields of science,
medicine, and engineering typically have more invention disclosures than those that do
research in other areas. In addition, inventions that yield new products are more likely to
be significant for the purposes of commercialization than those that give rise to new
processes.
Fragmentation
The multiple schools and teaching hospitals that comprise Harvard University and the
Harvard Medical Community were the subject of discussion by many of the interviewees.
Several felt there was "fragmentation" in the Medical School Community and that this
accounts for the different levels of entrepreneurship and commercialization of ideas seen
at the Harvard Medical Community and MIT.
Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts is a decentralized organization of nine
faculties overseeing its 12 schools and colleges. Both Harvard Medical School and its
School of Dental Medicine are located on one campus adjacent to the School of Public
Health in Boston, Massachusetts. The Harvard Graduate School of Business
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Administration is located in another venue in Boston across the Charles River from the
main campus in Cambridge. The physical separation of the schools and faculties of
Harvard University clearly limits interactions among the faculty and staff of the different
schools. For example, the Medical School has its own technology transfer office and is
separate from the Office of Technology and Trademark Licensing located on the main
campus of the University in Cambridge.
The Medical School Campus encompasses three major teaching hospitals (Beth Israel
Deaconess Hospital, Brigham and Women's Hospital, and The Children's Hospital) as
well as Dana-Farber Cancer Institute and the Joslin Diabetes Center all of which are
located adjacent to each other. The Massachusetts General Hospital, a major component
of the Medical School Community, is located in a different section of Boston. All are
separate organizational and financial entities and each supports its own technology
transfer office. In contrast, Boston University School Of Medicine and its teaching
hospital are not only adjacent to each other, but share the same technology transfer office
that serves all of Boston University. Thus, Harvard University and the Harvard Medical
Community are fragmented physically, organizationally, and financially.
Findings
"Fragmentation" of the Harvard Medical Community was noted by 9 of the 19
interviewees. In spite of the fact that none felt that fragmentation was a major factor
affecting the level of commercialization at Harvard University and the Harvard Medical
Community, almost all agreed that fragmentation was a negative influence. Two
interviewees felt that the existence of multiple entities lead to the investigators being
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confronted with competing forces. Two others felt that cooperation and coordination was
poor among the hospitals and the medical school. The dispersion of the buildings at
Harvard was believed by Interviewee G to play a small negative role by reducing
interaction and potential collaboration. Interviewee A emphasized that at MIT, even
though Sloan is at the far end of the campus, there are nevertheless faculty members from
the engineering, science and other schools to be found at the School of Management and
vice-versa.
Discussion
Although fragmentation may not be a major cause of reduced amounts of
entrepreneurship at Harvard University and the Harvard Medical Community it was the
general consensus of the interviewees that a critical mass of people and resources are
desirable in order to develop a system to support inventors and others interested in
entrepreneurship and the commercialization of ideas. The competing forces at Harvard
University, the Medical School, and the hospitals may also create an atmosphere that
decreases possibly important interactions that might under different circumstances lead to
collaboration among the faculty and staff of the different disciplines. In addition, the
multitude of separate and smaller technology transfer offices in the Harvard Medical
Community does not allow each office to develop the diversity of skills that is found in a
centralized setting such as that at the Technology Licensing Office which supports the
entire MIT community.
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Mentorship and Role models
In order to facilitate the transfer of inventions and ideas from the university to the
commercial sector a supportive environment is beneficial. Role models and mentors are
a part of such an environment and can assist those interested in entrepreneurship and in
the commercialization of ideas. 29' 30 This section examines the opinions and views of the
interviewees about the importance of role models and mentors.
Findings
Ten of the interviewees were of the opinion that mentors and role models are an
important means for providing guidance and instruction to those interested in learnin
about entrepreneurship and the process of commercialization of ideas. On the other hand,
even though at Harvard and the Harvard Medical Community role models were less
available than at MIT some groups were more entrepreneurial than others and,
accordingly, those associated with had were more opportunities to learn the know-how.
Interviewee C stated that few people at the Harvard Medical Community realize they
may consider commercialization. Several interviewees felt that inventions and start-up
companies spun out of Harvard Medical Community should be publicized more widely
internally with emphasis on how they are being used to help patients and save lives.
29 Smilor RW, Gibson DV, Dietrich GB. University Spin-Out Companies: Technology Start-Ups from
UT-Austin. Journal of Business Venturing, 1990;5:63-76.
' Morrison JD, Wetzel WE. A Supportive Environment for Faculty Spin-OffCompanies. In Brett AM,
Gibson DV, Smilor RW, eds. University Spin-off Companies: Economic Development, Faculty
Entrepreneurs, and Technology Transfer. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield; 1991:123.
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Discussion
One of the most significant differences noted by the interviewees was the abundance of
role models and mentors familiar with entrepreneurship and the commercialization
process that was available at MIT as compared to the Harvard Medical Community.
They felt that the presence of role models was to some extent responsible for the amount
of entrepreneurship and commercialization found at academic institutions. In addition,
once mentoring is established, the mentors become part of an ongoing system that creates
new mentors who will, in turn, guide future generations of workers.
Those interested in commercialization of ideas benefit by having faculty, staff, and others
available to discuss entrepreneurship and the commercialization process. In some cases
this association can not only encourage the inventor, but may also make the difference
between success and failure in the commercialization process. Mentors can also help
those interested in creating a start-up company by giving advice and by enabling them to
develop a network of contacts. A critical mass of like-minded people interested in
commercialization creates a momentum to move forward in this direction and this should
be encouraged if a university is interested in developing more commercial interests and
opportunities among its faculty.
Cultural Differences
The history of entrepreneurship at MIT was briefly described in Chapter 2. From its
earliest days MIT has interacted strongly with industry. Thus, the culture at MIT has, no
doubt, been molded by its long involvement with commercialization and
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entrepreneurship. The cultural value that MIT derives from this relationship is, by no
means, available at all universities and is relatively weak at Harvard University. To be
sure, some people feel that exposure to industry may be a threat to intellectual freedom
and can result in changes in the values of academe. The interviewees' opinions about the
influence of industrial collaboration and commercialization on the culture at MIT and at
the Harvard Medical Community are discussed below.
Findings
The cultural differences between MIT, Harvard University, and the Harvard Medical
Community was the most commonly discussed topic, and was the subject of the views of
16 of the 19 interviewees. Interviewee A's remarks were particularly insightful noting
that in the MIT culture the activity of creating enterprises is considered part of the
creative process, whereas at Harvard creating enterprises is not "bad, but it is outside" of
the usual academic mission where ideas reign supreme.
Six interviewees, of whom four were entrepreneurs and inventors, stated MIT's cultural
history of being a pragmatically oriented institution founded to solve societal problems, is
the basis of the school's continuing interest in commercialization. Five of those
interviewed remarked about the organizational structure of MIT, describing it as
"monolithic," "less rigid," and with "a flat social structure where hierarchy is not
important," in contrast to what is seen at Harvard University and the Harvard Medical
Community. Some added that this structure and the absence of organizational, physical,
and financial "fragmentation" described previously in this chapter, contributed to the
cooperation between faculty, staff and others at MIT. Noteworthy were the comments of
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two interviewees who said intellectual property in the Harvard Medical Community that
is truly basic and at an early stage of development, is especially vulnerable to theft. This
situation can be tempting to unscrupulous individuals and may be responsible for the
"paranoia" displayed by some members of the community causing them to conceal their
work and be less willing to cooperate with one another.
Two interviewees added that the faculty at Harvard generally does not want to spend
years immersed in building a start-up company and prefers in most cases to license
inventions thereby enabling them to return to academic research. Moreover, eight of the
interviewees commented about the high level of awareness of entrepreneurship and
commercialization of ideas at MIT in contrast to the Harvard Medical Community and
how this, in itself, created even greater awareness through positive feedback. Interviewee
C stated that few people realize they may consider commercialization at Harvard.
Attitudes about industry-sponsored research and industrial collaboration were also
discussed by seven of the interviewees. Four comments were similar to that of
Interviewee B, who said that there is more mistrust at Harvard associated with doing
things jointly with industry whereas at MIT there is great interest in such an association.
In this connection, the founding of Biogen, Cambridge, Massachusetts, merits brief
comment. The company was founded by Professors Walter Gilbert of Harvard
University and Philip Sharp of MIT. Professor Sharp has retained his position with
Biogen and also continues to function as a faculty member at MIT. In contrast, Professor
Gilbert, who has also retained his association with Biogen, but left Harvard University in
the midst of great controversy about the company.
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Five noted the importance of technology transfer as an avenue for the dissemination of
research discoveries. Interviewee E stated that most investigators consider publishing as
the main avenue for establishing priority and disseminating their findings. He went on to
say commercializing is another means of knowledge dissemination and along with
publication should be actively pursued. Furthermore, several of those interviewed
expressed views similar to those of Interviewee A, who said individuals are recognized
favorably at MIT for their entrepreneurial activities and industrial ties and working with
industry is respectable and a source of great pride.
Discussion
Although cultural differences between MIT, Harvard University and the Harvard Medical
Community were clearly visible, it was noted by some of those interviewed that the
culture at MIT was more like that at the Harvard Medical Community than that at
Harvard University. Thus, cultural differences can explain, at least in part, the variations
in the character and extent of industrial collaboration and entrepreneurship seen at MIT
and at the Harvard Medical Community. Although, the culture of an organization is not
unlike its traditions in that neither is readily subject to change, several people suggested
internal publicity about commercial successes may be beneficial in enhancing faculty
interest in these areas at Harvard University and the Harvard Medical Community.
The role of patient care in the Harvard Medical Community and its mission for humanity
was not felt to be a significant barrier to industrial relationships or entrepreneurship. In
addition, none of the interviewees indicated that the investigators at the different
institutions were better than or significantly different from each other. Thus, in the
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Harvard Medical Community there are scientists and clinicians while at MIT there are
scientists and engineers.
University Venture Funds
The transfer of new ideas from universities to the commercial sector can be done in a
variety of ways. The creation of start-up companies based on licensed university
technology is one method to facilitate technology transfer. The creation of start-up
companies is attractive to universities because such companies enhance their reputation,
sometimes assist with recruiting researchers interested in entrepreneurship, and if
successful can be quite profitable, since the universities frequently take equity
positions.3'
This chapter examines support for the creation of spin-off companies through the use of
university-associated venture funds, i.e., internal venture capital funds. These funds can
have several aims, but generally, they help inventors turn premature technology into
commercial enterprises that may then become attractive to other investors or mainstream
venture capitalists. The need for university-associated venture funds may be greater for
universities located in areas where traditional venture capital is less available or where
established investors have little interest in small seed-round investments.
3' Salemi T. Medical Schools Forming Funds to Plug Seed Gap. Venture Capital & Health Care.
Wellesley. MA: Asset Alternatives; March 1999;3(3):25.
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The three most commonly used models to increase seed funding for potential spin-off
companies are listed below:32
* The university creates an independent fund that has access to the school's technology.
This is the most common model and the school often invests in the fund. An example
is ARCH Venture Partners of the University of Chicago.
e The university creates and manages its own fund using its own money, such as an
endowment, that invests in the school's technology. This is currently being used at
Vanderbilt University in Nashville.
* The third model seeks to affiliate with outside venture capital groups to
commercialize university technologies. This route is now being followed at the
University of Alabama-Birmingham to cite one example.
Another method used by universities to help new spin-off companies succeed is through
business incubators and research science parks that share some of the risks associated
with new business ventures. In general, a business incubator is a physical facility,
located close to the university, that provides low rent and helpful support services.
Participants can carry out proof of concept experiments, build prototypes, and have
greater access to the expertise available at the university.
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32 Ibid.
Harvard University and Boston University have university-associated venture funds:
Medical Science Partners and the Community Technology Fund, respectively, that are
briefly described below.
Medical Science Partners
Medical Science Partners (MSP) was established in 1988 by Harvard University and its
aim is to "bridge the development gap between scientific research and industrial product
development." According to one interviewee, who is familiar with MSP, this firm's
specific goal was to enable "Harvard Medical School to transfer technology from the
laboratory to the patient's bedside." Harvard has a 10% share in the general partnership
of MSP through a wholly-owned subsidiary, ION Inc. Harvard avoids conflict of interest
by not investing directly in MSP's fund. MSP does not have first rights to Harvard
technology. Approximately 85% of MSP's investments are "Harvard-related," a concept
which is met by having at least one person from Harvard Medical School affiliated with
the funded company in one capacity or another, e.g., advisor. Its two funds have raised a
total of $67 million and as of September 1998, have successfully started 25 companies of
which 8 are public companies. MSP's input also includes the selection of experienced
business managers to head the new ventures.
Community Technology Fund
The Boston University Community Technology Fund (CTF) was started in 1975 to assist
with technology transfer and also to function as a venture capital fund. The fund
primarily invests in inventions from inside Boston University, but will occasionally
invest in outside companies. In addition to screening the university's intellectual
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property it also has the task of forming limited partnerships with those that want to invest
in the school's technology. In contrast to Medical Science Partners of Harvard Medical
School, the money invested in CTF is exclusively from Boston University. They
typically support early stage innovations and limit investments to the fields of
healthcare/biotechnology and information technology because of the University's
strength in these market sectors. They often will join with an external venture capital
firm who will take the lead role in helping to assure that the technology merits
investment. An important function of CTF is to provide business know-how and
administrative personnel. They also help with networking in the business community.
CTF typically invests between $250,000 and $750,000 as an initial investment, although
it does award some smaller amounts of seed money to develop inventions that show
promise of becoming the basis of start-up companies.
Findings
Thirteen of the interviewees discussed the value of university-associated venture capital
funds. Two of them favored seed stage funding in the $25,000-$75,000 range for
technology too premature to be supported by the venture capital community. Two others
noted that this level of funding would not have a major impact on launching start-up
companies. In addition, two interviewees were concerned about institutional politics
influencing the choice of projects to be supported. Three interviewees commented
positively on the Boston University Community Technology Fund, noting the
raF-:. ency of the fund's managers in working with start-up companies and in its ability
to publicize on campus the potential value of commercialization. The role of Medical
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Science Partners was discussed with five interviewees, all of whom felt that it had no
significant impact in the Harvard Medical Community. Interviewee K looked upon MSP
as he would any other venture capital fund and considered it to be attracted to the same
deals and opportunities as other venture capital firms.
Discussion
Most of the interviewees felt that in the Boston area there is such facile access to
mainstream venture capital that, in comparison, university venture funds do not
contribute significantly in enlarging the sphere of entrepreneurship. This was particularly
true of Medical Science Partners of Harvard Medical School. Interestingly, MIT has
neither a university-associated seed fund nor an internal venture fund yet still manages to
spin-off a significant number of new companies each year.
Established venture capital firms are growing in size and this growth has diminished the
availability of seed and early stage capital. This state of affairs may increase interest by
universities in establishing their own venture funds to fill this gap. In addition, a
university-associated venture fund should prove especially attractive to universities in
locations where there is less access to mainstream venture capital. However, it should be
pointed out that where there is access to mainstream venture capital, university venture
funds may help only that minority of potential company founders who are "at the
margin."
If a university is considering establishing an internal venture fund, first, and as pointed
out by two interviewees, the fund should not have the right of first refusal to fund new
technologies at the school, as this may hurt relationships with external venture capitalists,
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who may well feel that they have "second pick" of inventions. Second, it is important
that the university attract experienced people to run its venture fund if it genuinely wishes
to improve the chances for success and to avoid mediocre results. Finally, university
officials should be careful not to overestimate the value of intellectual property created
on their campus and put too much money into a deal. In this regard it should be noted
that the Boston University Community Technology Fund may owe its success to the fact
that its investments are focused on those core areas wherein the university has great
expertise. In addition, the managers of the Community Technology Fund have strong
relationships with principle investigators and attempt to create positive internal publicity
about entrepreneurship and commercial successes throughout the entire university.
Other Issues
Technology Transfer
Technology Transfer Offices
The topic of university and hospital technology transfer offices was discussed by 10 of
the interviewees, all of whom agreed these offices are a genuine asset to their institutions.
Seven singled out for praise the MIT Technology Licensing Office for the following
reasons: the office encourages inventors to work with it to "push ideas out the door," its
operation is relatively transparent, and it is "good at deal making." Two interviewees
remarked that at MIT technology transfer was a relatively quick process as compared to
other institutions. Of note, two interviewees said Boston University's Technology
Transfer Office was knowledgeable about creating and working with start-up companies
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and had a good network for bringing people together. "Deal making" and connecting
inventors with entrepreneurs and with venture capitalists was felt to be an important role
of the technology transfer office according to three interviewees, who also believed these
offices have succeeded in increasing the growth of entrepreneurship and
commercialization of ideas at MIT and Boston University. Interviewee H said that in his
opinion the licensing function of the technology transfer offices was a less important
factor than that of bringing people together.
Finally, the subject of unrecognized intellectual property was discussed with two
interviewees. Both felt that undisclosed intellectual property generally results from an
inventor's failure to appreciate the merit of an idea or invention rather than from his lack
of knowledge of the procedure for disclosing an invention. The climate of awareness was
believed by some interviewees to be greater at MIT than at Harvard University and the
Harvard Medical Community; they felt this condition at these places can be remedied by
simply increasing publicity about disclosures, patents, and licenses.
Licensing Versus Creation of a Start-up Company
The question of pursuing technology licensing versus creating a start-up company was
discussed by five interviewees. Three interviewees, two of whom are associated with
Harvard University and the third with the Harvard Medical Community, commented that
the preferred route in most cases is to license the technology; this choice enables the
faculty member to return to academic research quickly. Three people, also from, the
same institutions, noted that if a potentially good invention is difficult to license, but
holds promise of serving as a foundation for a start-up company, the creation of a start-up
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company may be the better route to pursue. Interviewee Q said that in order to consider a
start-up company as an alternative to licensing, the technology transfer official must be
especially adept in creating such companies and have an eye for seeking out technologies
that are able to stand on their own. He went on to point out that both MIT and Boston
University were fortunate in having such talented technology transfer personnel.
Lastly, two interviewees felt that the Harvard Medical Community Technology Transfer
Offices were understaffed especially when compared to MIT. They suggested that the
staffs be enlarged so that more attention can be paid to creating start-up companies and
marketing of intellectual property.
Equity
This subject was discussed with three interviewees, admittedly a relatively small sample
of those taking part in the study, who felt that, in general, the question of company equity
should no longer be worrisome for inventors or institutions experienced in the areas of
entrepreneurship and commercialization. The current conflict of interest policies of the
institutions were believed to be adequate for averting potential problems associated with
equity.
In fiscal yearl 1997, the number of licenses executed for equity at Harvard University
including the Medical School was two, at the Harvard teaching hospitals it was four, and
at MIT it was eight.33 Taking an equity position in a company in lieu of a royalty stream
'' Massing, op. cit., 138, 158.
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is one way for institutions to assist new companies that may not have adequate cash to
pay for licensing. From the licensee's point of view equity is advantageous because it
provides an incentive to the inventor to support the new venture.
Company Boards
This topic was discussed briefly with five interviewees and all felt that for a start-up
company to be successful the inventor must be willing, at a minimum, to come on board
as a scientific advisor. Interviewee C reported that his membership on the boards of
several companies has proven very fruitful for him. He found that working with industry
and with venture capitalists is a worthwhile experience and that the networking that
resulted was especially beneficial. Furthermore, involvement with industry has been
helpful in enabling him to focus his academic research on some unusually fascinating and
rewarding problems.
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Chapter 6: Summary and Recommendations
Summary
A series of interviews was conducted in order to identify factors that may account for the
perceived differences in attitudes toward entrepreneurship and commercialization found
at MIT and at Harvard Medical School and its associated research hospitals. This study
was expected to suggest ways to increase future opportunities for these and other
institutions to participate in these kinds of commercial enterprises. Nineteen interviewees
participated in this endeavor; they identified several factors that may account for the
observed differences. However, no one factor was singled out as the most important.
Several of these factors are summarized below; it will be noted that some of them are
interrelated.
I. The nature of the intellectual property found at an institution plays a vital role in
determining whether the institution can engage successfully in entrepreneurship
and the commercialization of ideas. Some types of technology are particularly
attractive to a licensee; especially those that are more easily protected by patents
and copyrights, and are more amenable for use as a basis for a start-up company.
The intellectual property originating from an institution is a reflection of the
university's mission and cannot be easily changed.
2. The presence of mentors and role models can have a big effect on the quantity and
quality of entrepreneurship and commercialization found at academic institutions
82
and is perhaps the most important factor of all those described in this report. In
addition, once mentoring is established at an institution, the mentors may become
part of a self-perpetuating system that creates new mentors who will, in turn,
guide future generations of workers. Mentors most commonly help those
interested in commercialization of ideas or in creating a start-up company by
offering them advice and by enabling them to develop a network of contacts.
3. Cultural differences can explain some of the variations in the character and extent
of industrial collaboration and entrepreneurship seen at MIT and the Harvard
Medical Community. Clearly, an institution's history and traditions play a role in
molding its culture, as demonstrated in the case of MIT which has a long-standing
involvement with commercialization. The culture of an organization is not unlike
its traditions in that neither is readily subject to quick change in this regard and
several interviewees pointed out that internal publicity about commercial success
may be beneficial in enhancing faculty interest. The culture of an institution also
may affect its attitude toward the concept of conflict of interest which itself can be
influenced by the institution's traditions.
4. The issue of conflict of interest which appears to be quite significant at Harvard
University and the Harvard Medical Community, is apparently less of an
impediment to entrepreneurship and commercialization at other institutions. The
"dampening effect" created by the conflict of interest policy at Harvard is most
likely related to the tight coupling of the Harvard culture and these rules.
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5. A critical mass of people and adequate resources is desirable in order to develop a
system that supports inventors and others interested in entrepreneurship and the
commercialization of ideas. The competing forces at Harvard University, its
Medical School, and the hospitals create an atmosphere that decreases potentially
important interactions that under different circumstances might lead to
collaboration among the faculty and staff even across different disciplines.
6. Ideally, technology transfer should be a relatively quick process that encourages
inventors to assist in getting their ideas out of the institution. Furthermore, to
support the creation of start-up companies, it is important that technology transfer
offices bring together inventors, entrepreneurs, and investors (venture capitalists).
7. Although university venture funds do not contribute significantly to enlarging the
sphere of entrepreneurship they can prove especially attractive to universities
located in areas where there is reduced access to mainstream venture capital.
Nonetheless, university venture funds can benefit an institution by increasing
awareness of entrepreneurship and the process of creating start-up companies.
Study Limitations
Some limitations of this study are that it does not examine industry-sponsored research or
other techniques of technology transfer such as consulting. The main thrust of this study
has been directed toward the factors that influence peoples' interest in technology
licensing and the creation of start-up companies. This study which is based on
information obtained from 19 interviews is limited by its small sample size which
reduces the opportunity to do meaningful subgroup analysis of the interviewee responses
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according to occupation. Other limitations include possible bias in the selection of
interviewees and the variation in the set of questions used in the interviews.
Conclusion
The nature of an institution's intellectual property is a reflection of its culture, traditions,
history, and mission. These qualities which define the institution are rather resistant to
change. However, by increasing awareness of entrepreneurship and commercial success
through role models and positive internal publicity, the institution may be change for the
better the attitude of its researchers and workers toward entrepreneurship and
commercializing of ideas. Accessibility to mentors and role models and the availability
of activities which enable researchers to learn about entrepreneurship and
commercialization were considered by some interviewees to be the most significant
factors for increasing awareness and knowledge of these processes. In this regard, the
presence of a transfer office that facilitates the bringing together of inventors and
entrepreneurs is especially helpful. An outstanding collection of talent and activities
directed toward collaboration and cooperation is clearly operating at MIT and
successfully perpetuates interest in commercialization and entrepreneurship.
General Recommendations
I. Increase the availability of mentors and role models who are familiar with
entrepreneurship and have experience in working with industry.
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2. Increase awareness and acceptance of entrepreneurship and commercialization as
an alternative avenue for knowledge dissemination thereby complementing
traditional publication.
Two examples of successful programs that increase awareness of
entrepreneurship at MIT are the $50K Business Plan Competition, open to
university students and researchers, and the MIT Enterprise Forum, organized and
run by MIT alumni. These programs not only provide information about the
process of commercialization and entrepreneurship, but they also offer a network
which succeeds in facilitating cooperation between people from both inside and
outside the institution. In addition, both programs have the incidental advantage
of introducing individuals interested in entrepreneurship to one another and also
to possible mentors and role models.
3. Technology transfer should be a quick process that facilitates the bringing
together of inventors, entreprenurs, and investors. In order to increase the degree
of awareness of commercialization, the technology transfer office should
routinely prompt each faculty member to disclose any potential inventions rather
than depend on the investigator himself to voluntarily visit the technology transfer
office.
4. The institution's conflict of interest policy should be clearly written and be non-
intimidating.
5. Increase the availability of university venture funds at institutions located in
places remote from mainstream venture capital.
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Specific Recommendations
Considerations as they pertain to Harvard University and the Harvard Medical
Community follow; under certain circumstances they may be also applicable to other
institutions.
· Increase collaboration between Harvard Business School, the Harvard Medical
Community, and other Harvard University schools. For example, this can be done on
a small scale by publicizing the annual Harvard Business School Business Plan
Competition and opening it up to all of Harvard University.
· Establish a general university entrepreneurship program encompassing all of Harvard.
Its goal would be achieved, at least in part, by sponsoring activities which enhance
cooperation and collaboration between the different schools and hospitals. One
example of the type of program advocated here is the Entrepreneurship Center at
MIT.
· Create an additional academic track at Harvard Medical School for physicians
interested in entrepreneurship as suggested by Interviewee R, which would allow
reduced patient care and fewer academic responsibilities. These individuals would
participate in seminars and other events which would, in turn, teach the process of
commercialization and entrepreneurship to other members of the Harvard Medical
Community. A similar arrangement that embodies some of the features
recommended here, although not an official track in itself, is available in the Health
Care Entrepreneurship Program at Boston University. This program provides
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students and academic fellows interested in entrepreneurship with an opportunity for
hands-on experience.
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